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COMMENT
WHEN ARE WE GOING TO LEARN: THE ROLE OF
LAWYERS IN CORPORATE FRAUD
ALEXANDER KLEIN
I.

INTRODUCTION

In an age where business and industry are booming, the complexities
that go along with it are growing. With a rapid increase in technology,
finance, and infrastructure comes a rapid increase in government and legal
regulation. As these regulatory frameworks become more and more
convoluted, the opportunity to exploit the gaps and make a quick profit also
become greater. This is not only true for business leaders and investors, but
also for trusted professionals such as auditors and lawyers.
This article will explore some of the worst corporate scandals of the
last few decades, the role that the lawyers played, and what the legal
profession has—and has not—done to address it. Part I will provide a brief
factual overview of scandals such as Enron, Petters Group Worldwide, and
Wells Fargo. Part II will explore the criminal, civil, and disciplinary actions,
or lack thereof, that were taken against the lawyers. Part III will focus on the
legal profession’s response to these scandals including: Section 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC’s rulemaking functions, the legal profession’s
rules of professional conduct, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
aiding-and-abetting liability under federal law. Finally, Part IV will explore
competing perspectives regarding lawyer accountability, and my view on
what the legal profession must do to once again become a trusted and moral
leader.

II.

THE SCANDALS

American society is no stranger to corporate fraud. However, we
have not always been privy to it. Prior to the late 1990s and early 2000s, most
of the U.S. population was unaware of the misconduct that was rampant in
the business and finance world. It was not until 2001 that people started to
pay attention. Even then, people rarely discussed the involvement of legal
practitioners. Before scandals like Enron, lawyers did not even have a duty
to report suspected misconduct to the CEOs or Directors of their own
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corporation. Everything started to change once Enron, the Wall Street
darling, began to fall.

A. Enron
Enron was established in 1985 in Houston, Texas. It was the result
of a merger between Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth, a Nebraska
pipeline company. 1 At the outset, Enron owned the nation’s largest gas
pipeline.2 It derived nearly all its value from hard assets.3 However, as the
gas industry became more and more deregulated, Enron shifted its operations
to energy trading.4 Companies that consume large quantities of natural gas
and oil turn to energy trading to ensure a predictable price.5 In under ten
years, Enron completely transformed its business from a hard-asset company,
to a commodity trading entity. 6 Notably, as the deregulation of the gas
industry continued, the price of gas and oil decreased.7 Prices became volatile
and unpredictable. In turn, companies that were reliant on large quantities of
oil and gas turned to Enron’s energy trading expertise to ensure stability.8
Enron began its evolution by spinning off its physical assets. 9 In
1985, at its inception, Enron owned and operated 37,000 miles of oil and gas
pipelines.10 By 2000—just fifteen years later—Enron only operated 25,000
miles of pipeline.11 However, Enron’s alleged profits and shareholder value
had significantly increased. In its Annual Report in 2000, Enron disclosed
that its sell-off of major assets had resulted in “the same earnings power with
less invested capital.” 12 The success of this business model did not go
unnoticed. Enron’s executives and directors sought to further increase their

1

C. William Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Enron, J. ACCT. (Mar. 31, 2002),
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2002/apr/theriseandfallofenron.html.
2
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessons from
Enron, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1787, 1793 (2002).
3
A “hard asset” is a physical asset that can be touched and felt.
4
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 2.
5
Id. (explaining that companies can utilize commodity futures to ‘lock in’ the
price of gas at a certain time in the future).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessons from
Enron, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1787, 1794 (2002).
11
Id.
12
ENRON ANNUAL REPORT (2000), https://fliphtml5.com/thnh/cnnm/basic.
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profits by not only expanding internationally, but by penetrating other
commodity markets wholly unrelated to energy.13
By 2000 and 2001, this brilliant tapestry of innovation created by
Enron and its executives began to unravel. Its demise was founded upon three
major components: (1) marking-to-market accounting, (2) Special Purpose
Vehicles (“SPV’s”), and (3) flawed oversight of auditing and legal services.14
In 1992, then-CFO Jeffrey Skilling, introduced a new accounting
method which allowed Enron to value its commodity trading investments at
market value, and realize revenues and losses, at the end of any given
quarter.15 Enron was given free rein to estimate the fair market value for its
investments—and record it as revenue on its income statement—when no
market actually existed.16 While this method was highly unconventional for
a pipeline company, and frankly misleading, it was given a stamp of approval
by the SEC on January 2, 1992.17
To maintain its credit ratings, and value of its commodity trading
investments, Enron had to maintain certain financial ratios including return
on assets (ROA) and leverage ratios.18 To accomplish this objective, it began
to offload large quantities of fixed assets and debt to SPVs.19 An SPV is a
shell company that is created for the sole purpose of removing assets and debt
from the main corporation’s balance sheet.20 Because Enron had less assets
and debt on its balance sheet, due to its extensive use of SPVs, its ROA and
leverage ratios improved.21 As these ratios improved, so did the credit ratings
and the valuation of the company’s stock.22 But, just because this debt is no
longer on the balance sheet, does not mean that Enron is off the hook.23 These
SPVs began to take on substantial levels of debt which Enron remained
responsible for. However, Enron was not required to disclose these debts on

13

Baird, supra note 10, at 1795.
Thomas, supra note 1.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV’T AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., REP. ON FIN.
OVERSIGHT OF ENRON (Comm. Print 2002).
18
Thomas, supra note 1.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
C. William Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Enron, J. ACCT. (Mar. 31, 2002),
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2002/apr/theriseandfallofenron.html.
14
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its balance sheet.24 Therefore, shareholders were misled into believing in the
financial vitality of Enron’s business model.25
While this is only the tip of the iceberg in the ocean of fraud and
deceit, how could this have possibly been approved by not only Enron’s
lawyers and accountants, but by the SEC itself? This is a question that has
been the subject of extensive investigations and academic work.26 But, in the
wake of this scandal and the fallout from these investigations, far more
corporate scandals have come to light. It seems that we have a long way to
go to restore the public’s faith in our age-old profession.

B. Petters Company, Inc.
Petters Company Inc. (“PCI”) was founded in 1988 by Thomas J.
Petters under the name of Amicus Trading Group. 27 Tom Petters was a
charming, generous, and successful salesman. In addition to his business
success, Petters was a generous philanthropist who donated to causes like the
Boys and Girls Club of America, MN Teen Challenge, and various women’s
shelters across the state of Minnesota.28 However, this generosity came at the
expense of the victims of his $3.6 billion-dollar Ponzi scheme.29
PCI was the investment subsidiary of Petters Group Worldwide. PCI
had an alleged business objective of purchasing and reselling consumer
electronics to big box retailers for a profit.30 However, not a single consumer
electronic was ever purchased or sold by PCI.31 From day one, Petters used
investor capital to maintain a façade of high returns by perpetuating—at the
time—the largest Ponzi scheme in U.S. history.32 He utilized investor funds
24

Id.
Id.
26
See e.g., N.Y.C. BAR, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE LAWYER’S ROLE
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006), https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/CORPOR
ATE_GOVERNANCE06.pdf.
27
Petters Timeline, STAR TRIB. (Mar. 24, 2011, 1:19 PM),
https://www.startribune .com/petters-timeline/71661967/.
28
Esme Murphy, Should Charities Have to Return Money Donated by Petters?;
Gov. to Decide, CBSN MINN. (Apr. 2, 2012, 6:46 PM), https://minnesota.cbslocal
.com/2012/04/02/should-charities-have-to-return-money-donated-by-petters-govto-decide/.
29
Id.
30
Tom Petters Case Summary, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usaomn/tom-petters-case-summary (last updated May 1, 2015).
31
Id.
32
Drew Sandholm, American Greed: The Rise and Fall of a Multibillion-Dollar
Ponzi Scheme, CNBC (Feb. 22, 2012, 12:23 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2012/
03/07/The-Rise-and-Fall-of-a-Multibillion-Dollar-Ponzi-Scheme.html.
25

2022]

WHEN ARE WE GOING TO LEARN

789

to pay off other defrauded investors, purchase companies with the intention
of hiding his fraudulent practices33, and maintain a lavish lifestyle.34
At PCI’s peak, Petters owned and operated some of the largest
corporations in the country including Sun Country Airlines, Fingerhut, and
Polaroid. 35 While these holdings were all legitimate businesses, their
operations were funded by bilking investors out of billions of dollars.36 PCI
was so successful that it was preparing to merge Polaroid and Kodak had
federal prosecutors not been approached by Petters’ close confidant, Deanna
Coleman, in 2008.
Petters perpetuated this fraud by providing investors with fabricated
financial statements, documents, and promissory notes.37 These documents
purported to show a successful and booming resale business. Often, Petters
personally guaranteed payment to investors through promissory notes. 38
However, Petters never paid a dime. To deceive investors into believing in
the success of the business, Petters would divert funds from one investor to
another.39 When he could not pay off investors in a timely manner, he made
up excuses. He claimed that these big box retailers owed PCI billions of
dollars and that he would satisfy his own debts once they had paid up.40 This,
clearly, was a lie. Throughout the duration of his Ponzi scheme, Petters
defrauded his investors in the amount of $3.6 billion dollars.41
This seemingly perfect business quickly crumbled after Deanna
Coleman, Vice President of Operations for PCI, and co-conspirator,
approached the federal government. 42 On September 8, 2008, she alleged
that, with her assistance, Petters had knowingly and intentionally defrauded
investors for the entirety of PCI’s existence. 43 Federal prosecutors at the
33

Petters ultimately purchased Fingerhut, Polaroid, and Sun Country Airlines as
a front to maintain the appearance of actual business operations. Id.
34
U.S. DEP’T JUST., supra note 28 (stating that Petters used investor funds to
purchase homes, yachts, and luxury vehicles).
35
Sandholm, supra note 32.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Drew Sandholm, American Greed: The Rise and Fall of a Multibillion-Dollar
Ponzi Scheme, CNBC (Feb. 22, 2012, 12:23 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2012/03/07/The-Rise-and-Fall-of-a-Multibillion-Dollar-Ponzi-Scheme.html.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
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United States Attorney’s Office in Minneapolis, MN were shocked at the
revelation.44 As part of the criminal investigation into the Petters Company,
Ms. Coleman agreed to wear a wire throughout conversations with Mr.
Petters. 45 These recordings, created by Ms. Coleman, and her subsequent
testimony at trial, were the “smoking guns” that prosecutors needed to take
down what was then the largest Ponzi Scheme recorded to date. 46 Her
testimony and participation in the investigation led to the ultimate conviction
of Mr. Petters47, four of Petters’ associates, five hedge fund managers, and
the indictments of two others.48

C. Wells Fargo
Even Wells Fargo, the nation’s largest commercial bank, is not
immune from falling into the trap of corporate fraud. Since its inception,
Wells Fargo had set the tone for a culture that is advanced by the desire to
build “lifelong [customer] relationships.” 49 Even throughout the banking
crisis in 2008, Wells Fargo emerged nearly unscathed due to their
unwavering commitment to their mission.50 John Stumpf, CEO, and Carrie
Tolstedt, head of Community Banking, were widely respected both inside
and outside of the organization.51 These two executives ranked among the
most successful and accomplished of their time. 52 However, as the nation
recovered from the 2008 banking crisis and ensuing economic collapse, and
the pressure mounted for higher and higher revenues and returns, Wells
Fargo resorted to less-than-savory sales methods.
For years, Wells Fargo engaged in a nationwide cross-selling scheme
which resulted in at least two million fraudulent bank and credit card

44

David Phelps, Petters’ Associate Deanna Coleman Freed after 11 Months in
Prison, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 25, 2011, 9:22 PM), https://www.startribune.com/pettersassociate-deanna-coleman-freed-after-11-months-in-prison/128421168/.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Mr. Petters was ultimately sentenced to fifty years in federal prison. Id.
48
Id. (stating that two other hedge fund managers are awaiting trial).
49
Brian Tayan, The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 6, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/06/th
e-wells-fargo-cross-selling-scandal-2/.
50
Id.
51
Jeffrey Pilcher, What Created Wells Fargo’s Corrupt Cross-Selling Culture?
Toxic Execs, FIN. BRAND (Apr. 17, 2017), https://thefinancialbrand.com/64880/
wells-fargo-cross-selling-culture-strategy/.
52
Id.
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accounts.53 Cross-selling is a sales technique where a sales professional is
tasked with selling a new product to an existing customer.54 The leadership
team set deliberately unattainable sales goals, and implemented strict
supervisory practices, which pressured low-level employees to push
unwanted products on customers. 55 If weekly sales goals were not met,
employees faced termination. As a result of this pressure, employees who
could not attain their weekly sales goals would open fraudulent accounts
without the customer’s consent. Contrary to statements made by Wells’ top
executives, it is now public knowledge that this scandal was perpetuated from
the highest levels within the corporation. When all was said and done, Wells
Fargo employees had opened millions of fraudulent accounts, and defrauded
its own customers out of millions of dollars.56
The first grumblings of potential fraud emerged in 2013.57 The LA
Times reported that nearly thirty Wells Fargo employees had been terminated
for forging customer signatures to open unauthorized accounts. 58 These
fraudulent accounts were opened to meet the exceedingly unattainable sales
targets set by Wells’ corporate office.59 However, at the time, Wells’ public
relations team blamed the scandal on a “breakdown in a small number of . . .
team members.”60 The corporate office admitted that all team members had
sales “goals,” but did not admit to any excessive top-down pressure to meet
these sales targets.61
By 2016, Wells Fargo had agreed to a settlement that resulted in $2.6
million dollars of restitution, termination of 5,300 employees, a $185 million
dollar fine, and an independent investigation. 62 The board of directors
engaged Shearman and Sterling to conduct this independent investigation
and issue a public report. In its principal findings, the report states that “the
root cause of the sales practice failures was the distortion of the Community

53

Tayan, supra note 49.
What is Cross Selling?, SALESFORCE, https://www.salesforce.com/eu/learnin
g-centre/sales/cross-selling/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2021).
55
Pilcher, supra note 51.
56
Tayan, supra note 49.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Tayan, supra note 49.
62
Id.
54
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Bank’s sales culture and performance management system.” 63 It placed
blame on the Community Banking senior leadership team, inaction of the CSuite executives to “investigate or critically challenge sales practices,” and
failure to truthfully disclose these concerns to the attention of the board.64 To
this day, there are still wide-ranging consequences affecting the business of
Wells Fargo and its customers.65

III.

THE LAWYERS

These three scandals represent a minute portion of corporate fraud
that has occurred over the years. While each of these scandals were
perpetuated by top business executives, the lawyers involved never raised
any red flags. A lawyer’s job, and utmost duty, is to protect the interests of
their client. But, in the context of corporate law, the line between client and
non-client can become all too blurred. Model Rule of Professional Conduct
1.13(a) states that a “lawyer employed . . . by an organization represents the
organization.”66 This distinction seems obvious, yet a violation of this rule is
a common factor among each corporate scandal discussed above. When a
violation of Model Rule 1.13 results in assistance of a non-client’s fraud, it
can result in disciplinary action, or worse, a criminal conviction. But, what
were the consequences for the lawyers from Enron, Petters, and Wells Fargo
who were involved in some of the greatest frauds in United States’ history?
This section will describe the actions of the lawyers, explore the intentional
wrongdoing, and illuminate the perils of willful blindness in the attorneyclient relationship.

A. Enron
If Enron did not have a sophisticated team of legal advisors, it would
be easy to understand how it transformed from a legitimate business into a
63
Independent Directors of the Board of Wells Fargo & Company Sale Practice
Investigation Report (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/ assets/
pdf/about/investor-relations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf [hereinafter Sale
Practice Investigation Report].
64
Id.
65
Austin Weinstein, Wells Fargo Small Business Clients Miss Out on Billions
in Aid Due to Scandal Punishment, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Apr. 8, 2020, 9:25 AM),
https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/business/banking/article241846121.html
(explaining that Wells Fargo’s customers have had difficulty obtaining access to
“paycheck protection loans” during the COVID-19 outbreak due to the lending caps
that were instituted on Wells Fargo as a result of this scandal. The Fed eventually
loosened these restrictions, but not before it caused stress and anxiety to customers).
66
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
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fraudulent Ponzi-esque scheme. However, Enron had a legal team of at least
250 in-house lawyers and employed over one hundred law firms.67 Among
these outside law firms, Vinson & Elkins, the second largest law firm in
Texas, completed the bulk of Enron’s legal work.
James Derrick, the General Counsel of Enron, had the stated
objective of forming a “world class in-house law firm.”68 To accomplish this
objective, Derrick formed individual legal teams within each business
segment at Enron.69 Each department had in-house attorneys, its own General
Counsel, and direct reporting to Derrick himself.70 Derrick also hired Rex
Rogers as an Associate General Counsel tasked with ensuring compliance
with all securities laws.71 In addition to forming extensive and experienced
legal teams, Derrick held weekly meetings between all in-house lawyers to
discuss concerns about Enron’s business dealings.72 Despite holding these
weekly meetings, no concerns were ever reported—including no reports of
any concerns about Enron’s compliance with SEC regulations or U.S.
securities laws.73
In addition to 250 “world class” in-house lawyers, Enron employed
Vinson & Elkins to structure its SPV partnerships.74 These SPVs became the
center of the SEC and governmental investigations that ultimately led to the
convictions of Enron’s CEO, CFO, and Directors.75 In addition to assisting
Enron in the formation of these SPVs, Vinson & Elkins went one step further
and was retained by Enron’s Board of Directors to investigate any
wrongdoing by the corporation.76 Max Hendrick III, a partner at Vinson &
Elkins, provided an opinion letter to the General Counsel of Enron stating
that he believed Enron had not engaged in any illegal conduct.77 In essence,
67

In re Enron Corp. et al., No. 01-16034 (AJG), at 15 (Appendix C (Role of
Enron’s Attorneys) to Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner).
68
Id. at 16.
69
Id. at 17.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
In re Enron Corp. et al., supra note 67, at 18.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 22.
75
It’s the Lawyers’ Turn to Answer for Enron, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2002),
https://www.forbes.com/2002/03/14/0314topnews.html#5630666e393e.
76
Enron’s Lawyers: Eyes Wide Shut?, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2002),
https://www.forbes.com/2002/01/28/0128veenron.html#235839edfa88.
77
Id. (explaining that the investigation was completed with significant
restrictions on its scope).
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Enron hired Vinson & Elkins to structure a fraudulent transaction, and then
tasked the very same law firm with the investigation into any misconduct.
While Vinson & Elkins has continued to disclaim any involvement in
Enron’s fraud, it ultimately settled with Enron’s bankruptcy estate in the
amount of $30 million dollars.78

B. Petters Company, Inc.
The historic collapse of PCI illustrates another example of the farreaching consequences of ignorance. Not a single lawyer, auditor, or savvy
hedge fund manager noticed the red flags.79 While it is unclear if PCI had its
own legal team, Petters Group Worldwide, PCI’s parent company, had a
sophisticated team of lawyers. Michael Phelps joined Petters Group
Worldwide in 2004 with six years of experience at a large Minneapolis law
firm, Leonard Street & Deinard.80 David Baer, another former Leonard Street
& Deinard lawyer, joined Petters Group Worldwide in 2006.81 Not only did
these men lead a successful practice, but Mr. Baer was even named a top-15
lawyer in the tate of Minnesota. 82 Additionally, PCI was represented by
Fredrikson & Byron for more than ten years. While none of these lawyers or
firms committed any criminal wrongdoing, or gross professional misconduct,
it begs the question: where were the lawyers? This multibillion-dollar fraud
is just another illustration of the shortcomings of our response following the
historic fall of Enron.
When the Petters indictment first came down, both Mr. Baer and Mr.
Phelps resigned from Petters Group Worldwide immediately.83 Both of these
successful attorneys denied any knowledge of criminal wrongdoing at PCI.84
While they may not have affirmatively committed any wrongdoing, it
highlights the perils of willful blindness in the attorney-client relationship.
For example, many of PCI’s transactions were negotiated and
approved by Petters’ legal team. 85 In particular, Interlachen Harriet
78

Vinson & Elkins, Enron Reach Settlement, HOUS. BUS. J. (June 2, 2006),
https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/2006/05/29/daily30.html.
79
Jennifer Bjorhus & David Phelps, Petters Co.: Many Watchers, but No One
Watching, STAR TRIB. (Nov. 16, 2008, 3:42 PM), https://www.startribune.com/
petters-co-many-watchers-but-no-one-watching/34524834/.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Bjorhus & Phelps, supra note 79.
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Investments (“Interlachen”), an investment fund operating out of
Minneapolis, agreed to invest money into PCI’s resale business.86 This deal
was negotiated between Petters’ lawyers and a lawyer for Interlachen. 87
During the initial meetings, Interlachen’s attorney requested to inspect
Petters’ inventory. 88 This request was denied. 89 While this gave pause to
Interlachen’s lawyers, they ultimately went through with the deal based on
Petters’ promise to guarantee the investment with his own money. 90 It
remains unclear why neither Phelps nor Baer questioned Petters’ refusal to
allow Interlachen to conduct a due diligence investigation into its business
transactions. Not only was there no actual inventory, Petters would never
stand up to his promise. By placing blind trust in a charming—yet
fraudulent—businessman, Interlachen was bilked out of more than $60
million dollars.

C. Wells Fargo
In the case of Wells Fargo, the reputational damage that the
corporation suffered can be blamed on the professional negligence and
“willful blindness” of its in-house legal department. In the 110-page
investigative report ordered by Wells’ board of directors, Shearman and
Sterling alleged that Wells’ legal department underestimated the reputational
risk that illegal sales methods could carry.91
Wells Fargo’s legal department was aware of the cross-selling
scheme, and possible illegal conduct, as early as 2002.92 Following the first
“mass termination” of low-level employees in 2002, Wells’ legal department
was only concerned with litigation risk associated with a wrongful
termination lawsuit. 93 In its assessment of risk, the legal department only
considered past settlements for wrongful termination.94 It did not consider
the reputational risk associated with potential illegal conduct. The practice of

86

David Phelps, Friday: Petters Pressed for Quick Deals, Investor Testifies,
STAR TRIB. (Mar. 24, 2011), https://www.startribune.com/friday-petters-pressedfor-quick-deals-investor-testifies/67622517/.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Sales Practice Investigation Report, supra note 63.
92
Id. at 73.
93
Id. at 74.
94
Id.
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rubber-stamping questionable sales methods, while only calculating internal
litigation risk, continued for the next ten years.95
Even as these wrongful termination lawsuits continued to plague
Wells Fargo, its in-house legal department failed to question its sales
methods.96 The legal department believed, incorrectly, that the sales integrity
issues were only affecting the termination of employees. 97 It never
considered the possibility that its customers were being defrauded.98 This
unfounded belief led to the legal department’s failure to do its most core
function—protect its client from reputational risk and costly civil liability.
More strikingly, lower level attorneys in the legal department never
raised any concerns to senior attorneys.99 The head of the Employment Law
Section of the legal department did not learn of any significant reputational
risk until early October of 2013. 100 Even then, he only learned of these
concerns when he started to receive phone calls from journalists at the LA
Times.101 Wells Fargo’s General Counsel, James Strother, was not informed
of any concerns until the end of October 2013. 102 Neither the low-level
lawyers, the head of the Employment Law Section, nor the General Counsel
ever reported “up the ladder” to the board of directors.103
Perhaps the most egregious act of legal malpractice was that, prior
to the Los Angeles City Attorney’s lawsuit in 2015, the legal department
never considered the possibility that Wells Fargo’s sales practices were
adversely affecting its customers.104 Not once. Even after Wells Fargo agreed
to pay $185 million, the legal department never analyzed the potential for
widespread reputational risk to the corporation. 105 To this day, the
fundamental failure of the legal department has continued to significantly
damage the business potential of Wells Fargo.

95

Id.
Independent Directors of the Board of Wells Fargo & Company Sale
Practice Investigation Report 75 (Apr. 10, 2017) https://www08.wellsfargomedia.c
om/ assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/presentations/2017,/board-report.pdf.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 76.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Sales Practice Investigation Report, supra note 63.
103
Id. at 77.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 78.
96
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D. Where are the Lawyers Today?
One would think that the highly questionable, and likely illegal,
conduct of the lawyers involved in these fraudulent schemes would lead to
disbarment, criminal convictions, or at least professional discipline.
However, the lawyers involved, for example Vinson & Elkins, remain strong
staples in the legal community. This reality is largely because the legal
profession’s code of professional conduct is much different, and focuses
much more on confidentiality, than any other profession.
After the downfall of Enron, conviction of its top executives, and the
historic crumbling of Arthur Andersen, Enron’s lawyers have continued to
thrive. At first glance, one would believe that Vinson & Elkins was to blame
for Arthur Andersen’s illegal accounting practices. After all, Vinson &
Elkins is the firm that guaranteed the legality of these same accounting
practices.106 However, unlike an accountant’s professional responsibility, a
lawyer’s professional responsibility is to their client and not the public. While
this duty does not apply if the lawyer is aware of the illegal conduct, it
extends to the border between legal and illegal conduct.107
Today, Vinson & Elkins remains a staple. They employ 656 lawyers
in eleven offices throughout the world.108 This includes 125 equity partners,
72 non-equity partners and nearly 400 associates.109 It is ranked 75th in the
United States for size. 110 Additionally, it raked in nearly $800 million in
revenue in 2019.111 They generate more than $1.2 million per lawyer.112 This
makes Vinson & Elkins the 68th highest grossing law firm in the world.113
This is just one example of the disregard for wrongful conduct,
accountability, and professional responsibility. No lawyers were indicted or
disciplined in connection with Enron, Petters Company Worldwide, or Wells
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Fargo. 114 Even though extensive investigations have found highly
questionable conduct, it has resulted in nearly no action.

IV.

WHAT THE PROFESSION HAS DONE

Many corporate scandals and frauds involve the private securities
market. Prior to the Great Depression, there were virtually no protections for
investors in the private securities market. Over time, Congress and the legal
profession have adopted new legislation to address the accountability of
primary actors for their fraudulent practices. Additionally, as public scrutiny
has begun to amass, more and more protocols have been adopted to hold
secondary actors (i.e. lawyers) accountable for their complicity in the frauds
of their corporate clients. This section will explore the long-standing
precedents under Section 10(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the seminal Supreme Court decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (“PSLRA”), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), and the adoption of new
standards of professional responsibility for lawyers.
In the words of Senator Patrick Leahy, former Ranking Member of
the Judiciary Committee, “the worst part about [these] travest[ies] would be
if we do not learn from [them] and if we walk away.”115 While I do not
believe the legal profession has “walked away,” I do believe that we have a
long way to go to earn back the trust of the public, and the right to remain a
self-regulating profession. The sections discussed below highlight what the
profession has done to address rampant fraud following major corporate
scandals and economic disasters.

A. Section 10(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
As the nation began to recover from the Great Depression, Congress
enacted two major securities reform acts. The Securities Act of 1933 (“the
’33 Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the ’34 Act”). Among
the most important provisions are Section 10(b) of the ’34 Act and SEC Rule
10b-5.116
Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to “use or employ . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device . . . in contravention of . . . rules [or]
114
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regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary . . . for the
protection of investors.”117 In interpreting this statute, the SEC adopted Rule
10b-5 which made three types of fraud unlawful.118 An individual or entity
may be held liable if it: (1) employs a scheme, (2) makes any false statement
or omission, or (3) engages in any act which operates, or would operate, as a
fraud.119 The first and third bases of liability are known as “scheme liability,”
whereas the second basis is known as “false statement liability.”120 While
these provisions clearly hold primary violators (i.e. those who actually
employ a fraudulent practice) accountable, its effect on secondary actors,
such as lawyers, remained unclear.
After the ’34 Act was enacted and interpreted, federal courts were
flooded with private securities litigation.121 “Aiding and abetting fraud” was
amongst the most prevalent cause of action. Nearly every lower federal court,
including nearly every circuit, recognized an implied civil cause of action for
aiding and abetting fraud under Section 10(b).122 For nearly sixty years, this
provision opened up secondary actors, such as auditors and lawyers, to civil
liability for aiding a corporate client’s fraudulent practices.123 Based on this
wide ranging acceptance, the Supreme Court rejected certiorari for every case
raising questions of liability for aiding and abetting fraud under Section
10(b).124 However, this long-standing acceptance changed dramatically with
the Supreme Court decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver.125

B. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver
In 1994, for the first time since the enactment of the ’34 Act, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Section 10(b)(5)
provided an implied cause of action against an individual or entity that aids
117
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and abets the commission of securities fraud.126 The case arose when the
Colorado Springs Public Binding Authority (“the Authority”) defaulted on
its bond payments.127 The Authority had issued bonds to finance a real estate
development program.128 Soon after the default, the First Interstate Bank of
Denver (“Plaintiff”) alleged that the Central Bank of Denver (“Defendant”)
had aided and abetted the Authority in committing securities fraud.129 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.130 Under
the long-standing precedent that Section 10(b)(5) provided for a private cause
of action for aiding and abetting fraud, the Tenth Circuit reversed and ruled
in favor of the Plaintiff.131
In the first decision of its kind, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth
Circuit and held that there is neither an explicit—nor an implied—cause of
action for aiding and abetting securities fraud under Rule 10b-5. 132 Even
though aiding and abetting had been universally accepted, it must be
supported by the text of the statute.133 The Supreme Court declared that it
was not. Now, the only remaining avenue for holding secondary actors
accountable for their misfeasance would be to prove primary liability under
Section 10(b).

C. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
In response to the uproar created by the Supreme Court decision in
Central Bank, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 (“PSLRA”).134 Throughout the legislative process, the SEC urged
Congress to expressly overturn Central Bank and restore the private cause of
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action against secondary actors in the securities market.135 SEC Chairman,
Arthur Levitt, argued that Central Bank allowed secondary actors, such as
lawyers, to “be insulated from liability to private parties if they act behind
the scenes. Because this is conduct that should be deterred, Congress should
enact legislation to restore aiding and abetting liability in private actions.”136
However, the PSLRA did nothing to assuage any misgivings by the public.137
After thorough debate, Congress rejected the SEC’s view and declined to
overturn the Supreme Court’s ruling in Central Bank.
Instead, Congress vested authority in the SEC alone to enforce
violations of aiding and abetting fraud.138 Section 104 of the PSLRA, titled
“Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Aiding and Abetting,” states that:
any person that knowingly provides . . . substantial
assistance to another person in violation of a provision of
this title, or of any rule or regulation issued under this
chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision
to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is
provided.139
Now, to have any recourse against a lawyer who aids its client with
securities fraud, a private plaintiff still must prove that the lawyer is a primary
violator of any of the three subsections of Rule 10b-5.140 This distinction has
led to a circuit split on how to define “primary violations.”141
The “bright line” test, or majority view, only provides for liability of
secondary actors who directly or indirectly “make” a false statement or
omission.142 This narrow interpretation is followed by the Second, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits.143 The “substantial participation” test, or minority view,
provides for liability of secondary actors who “substantially participate” or
are “intricately involved” in the preparation of a misstatement made by
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another party.144 This massively broad interpretation is only followed by the
Ninth Circuit.145 A legislative reform that was intended to quell the public’s
concern about lawyer and accountant misconduct, has instead created even
more confusion than the original Central Bank decision.146

D. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
For years, Congress believed that SEC enforcement under the
PSLRA was sufficient to deter secondary actors from aiding and abetting
fraud. However, the shocking events of Enron brought this conclusion into
question once again. In 2002, in response to recent corporate fraud, Congress
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”). 147 Interestingly, a
proposal to reinstate a private cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud
was once again rejected by Congress.148 Instead, Congress asked the SEC to
conduct a study to determine the number of securities professionals who had
aided and abetted fraud from 1998 through 2001.149 In its report, the SEC
determined that there were 1,596 documented cases of securities
professionals who had aided and abetted fraud.150 Out of these cases, the SEC
had only brought enforcement actions against thirteen secondary actors.151
Despite these shocking discoveries, Congress has still rejected every
legislative attempt to reinstate a private cause of action against secondary
actors.
However, Sarbanes-Oxley does not let lawyers off the hook. Section
307 gave the SEC the authority to “prescribe minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the
commission.”152 The “minimum standard” adopted by the SEC requires an
attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities laws “up the
ladder” in the corporation to the general counsel and CEO. 153 In extreme
circumstances, where neither the General Counsel nor the CEO remedy the
144
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violation, the lawyer has a duty to report to the Board of Directors.154 This
familiar duty has been adopted by nearly every state in its version of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. A violation of this “up the ladder” mandate
can result in professional discipline, such as a private admonition, or even
disbarment.

E. Secondary Actor Liability Today
Even after Congress enacted the PSLRA and Sarbanes-Oxley, the
Supreme Court has continued to stand by its precedent in Central Bank.155 In
fact, it has continuously narrowed the circumstances in which a lawyer may
be held accountable for the fraud of their clients.156 In Stoneridge Investment
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a private
plaintiff cannot hold a secondary actor, such as a lawyer, liable by
circumventing the holding of Central Bank. This case arose when Stoneridge
alleged that Scientific-Atlanta had assisted Charter Communications in a
fraudulent business scheme. 157 According to Stoneridge’s complaint,
Scientific-Atlanta would sell cable boxes to Charter for $20 over market
price. Conversely, Charter would then overcharge Scientific-Atlanta for
advertising time on its television networks. Charter charged ScientificAtlanta the same price that Scientific-Atlanta charged them to create a
“wash” transaction between the two corporations. In violation of Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles, Charter then booked this fake transaction
as revenue in its quarterly report. Scientific-Atlanta even provided fraudulent
and backdated receipts of these transactions so that the transactions appeared
legitimate.
The Court ruled that, to succeed in a private cause of action under §
10(b), the plaintiff must show that it relied on the defendant’s deceptive
practices.158 A defendant’s assistance in the deceptive practices of another
entity is insufficient. Here, the fact that Scientific-Atlanta engaged in a
fraudulent transaction with Charter, or assisted Charter with its fraudulent
practice, does not rise to the level of liability under Rule 10b-5. In its opinion,
the Court heavily relied on the fact that Congress rejected the opportunity to
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reinstate a private cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud.159 While this
case did not directly involve lawyer conduct, it likely extends to all secondary
actors.
Further, in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, the
Supreme Court narrowly construed “false statement liability” under Rule
10b-5(b). 160 The Court held that a defendant is only liable if it had “ultimate
authority” over the “making” of a false statement or omission.161 A defendant
who merely assisted in preparing the false statement is a secondary actor and
cannot be held liable. 162 It follows, then, that a lawyer, who ignorantly
assisted their client in preparing a fraudulent statement, cannot be held liable
under Rule 10b-5.
Even after the PSLRA, the Supreme Court has made it harder and
harder for a private plaintiff to hold a lawyer liable for their participation in
corporate fraud. However, the Court has made it clear that lawyers are not
“off the hook.” In Lorenzo v. Securities & Exchange Commission, the
Supreme Court reiterated that a secondary actor may be held liable for aiding
and abetting fraud.163 But, only the SEC has this authority.164 Today—even
with the reforms adopted by the PSLRA, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the ruling in
Lorenzo—the SEC is the only plaintiff that can truly hold lawyers
accountable for aiding and abetting the fraud of their clients.

V.

WHAT WE SHOULD DO TO MOVE FORWARD

The profession’s focus on a regulatory patchwork for ex post facto
solutions to problems that have already arisen is inadequate. Now, with a
foundational understanding of the shortcomings of our profession, the
ultimate question remains: what have we learned and how will we move
forward? This section will address two prevailing theories on lawyer
accountability, insights from highly respected lawyers and legal scholars, and
my own views on how we can earn back the public’s faith in our ability to be
a self-regulating profession.

A. Lawyer as “Gatekeeper”
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In a highly controversial law review article, John C. Coffee advanced
the idea that a lawyer should act as a “gatekeeper.” 165 In simple terms, a
gatekeeper is an independent professional who serves a vital role in
protecting the interests of the client corporation and its investors.166 Coffee
suggested that a lawyer should owe a three-prong duty to their corporate
client and the investing public.167 First, a corporate lawyer should be required
to certify that they have conducted a limited review of the corporation’s
disclosures.168 Second, a corporate lawyer should be given the right to act
independently from the board of directors when it is engaged in certain
tasks—such as corporate investigations.169 Third, a corporate lawyer should
be subject to discipline for any negligence in conducting their limited review
of the corporation’s disclosures.170
Coffee argued that his first proposal, a certification requirement,
would acknowledge the lawyer’s role as a gatekeeper, but would have very
little effect on the professional liability of the corporate lawyer.171 Instead, he
argues that the SEC should impose a “negative certification” requirement.172
A negative certification is a requirement that the lawyer conduct a limited
due diligence review of a corporation’s disclosures and certify to investors
that they have “no reason to believe” that the disclosure is false or
misleading. 173 This requirement would ensure that a lawyer is at least
minimally involved in scrutinizing their client’s disclosures, but does not
become overly burdensome on the lawyer or the corporation. He argued that
the second proposal, independence from the board of directors, would
drastically decrease the potential for conflicts of interest.174
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 states that the corporation
is the client. 175 However, in practice, corporate lawyers have an inherent
conflict of interest because the board of directors and officers control the
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corporation.176 If the SEC mandated independence for certain tasks, such as
internal corporate investigations, the corporate lawyer would not have to
answer to the Board.177 Thus, the lawyer would be more likely to advocate
for the best interest of the corporation itself, and not the board or its
officers.178
Finally, Coffee advocates for the SEC to adopt a requirement of
limited due diligence.179 He argues that a negative certification requirement
would be ineffective unless the SEC also required that a lawyer actually
conduct a limited review of the corporation’s disclosures.180 Today, the SEC
has already adopted standards which require an auditor to conduct a due
diligence review of a corporation’s financial disclosures.181 The adoption of
SOX and Section 307 seem to indicate that the SEC has the power to adopt
a similar standard for securities lawyers.182 While Coffee does not believe
that a lawyer should be required to conduct a thorough investigation, he does
believe that a limited review is absolutely essential to properly represent the
interests of the corporation itself.

B. Demand-Side Reform
The “lawyer as gatekeeper” theory does not come without
criticism.183 As this theory of lawyer accountability has advanced, so has the
concern that it would “chill” communication between the lawyer and their
client.184 If the corporate lawyer is compelled to disclose potentially adverse
attorney-client communications to comply with rules of professional
conduct, the corporate client may not reveal pertinent information to their
lawyer for fear of prosecution.185 Though, there has been significant debate
about whether this concern should outweigh the lawyer’s role in ensuring
compliance with the law.
The Director of the Center for Corporate, Securities, and Financial
Law at Fordham Law School, Jill E. Fisch, advocates for reforms that focus
176
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on providing incentives to corporate officers and directors to seek more
effective assistance from their counsel. 186 She argues that threatening
corporate lawyers with civil liability will not only chill client
communication, but that it is also a less effective means of preventing
corporate fraud.187
As a preliminary matter, Ms. Fisch contends that the “up the ladder”
approach adopted by the model rules of professional conduct, and Section
307 of SOX, is unclear.188 Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 requires
that a lawyer, who has knowledge of their client’s unlawful actions, refer
such matters to the “highest authority” that can act on behalf of the
corporation.189 The comments to the rule clarify that the lawyer should only
approach the board if the officers fail to respond appropriately.190
First, she argues that this mandate does not clearly define the scope
of wrongdoing that is necessary to trigger the reporting requirement.191 In
other words, there is no guidance on when “up the ladder” reporting is or is
not required. Second, a lawyer shall only report to the board of directors if
the officers do not “sufficiently” respond.192 But, Section 307 does not define
what type of response is “sufficient.” Finally, the SEC only has power to
prescribe rules for lawyers who “practice before the commission.” Thus, the
SEC does not have authority to adopt rules that apply to every corporate
lawyer.193
In addition to these application problems, Ms. Fisch highlights the
practical implications that these requirements have on the practice of
corporate law. In modern day corporate America, there is an increasing
number of big law firms. Each of these firms are constantly battling for the
business of large corporations. After all, clients choose their lawyers, and
they may be fired at any time. This reality is followed with an inherent
conflict of interest between the lawyer’s duty to the corporation itself, and
the lawyer’s incentive to appease the officers of the corporation.
186
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This incentive applies with equal force to the individual lawyer. A
lawyer’s success is gauged by how much business they generate.
Additionally, a potential partnership hinges on this metric. It is not a surprise
then, that a lawyer may ignore their client’s borderline—or not so
borderline—misconduct to protect their own career. While Section 307,
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2, and Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.13 attempt to de-incentivize individual lawyers, it may be
necessary to incentivize corporate officers to act within the law as well.
While there is theoretical merit to this argument, its flaws have
become clear as more and more corporate fraud has been discovered. Even
though these propositions may be effective, there is a more obvious first step
forward.

C. The Best Step Forward
While I do not claim to have a better answer to these questions than
widely regarded legal scholars, I do believe that there are three commonsense reforms that the profession could adopt today: Coffee’s limited due
diligence requirement, increased professional responsibility enforcement,
and education.
Few professions are as highly trusted as the legal profession. Yet,
attorneys often accept their client’s statements in blind faith. Requiring a
lawyer to conduct a brief investigation into the statements of their client,
before affirming their actions, would make the lawyer’s representation more
effective and would do little to “chill” client communication. Further,
holding the lawyer accountable for their “willful blindness” would deter
future misconduct and reinforce the public’s faith in our profession. Finally,
using past cases of lawyer misconduct and continuing legal education
platforms to educate young law students would emphasize the ease with
which one can fall into this trap if they are not careful and vigilant. While
these ideas will not eradicate lawyer misconduct, it is a simple, inexpensive,
and effective first step forward.

1. The Limited Due Diligence Requirement
The first step that the profession could implement would be to
impose a limited due diligence and negative certification requirement on all
lawyers. This new rule would require a lawyer—after a brief investigation—
to publicly assert that they have “no reason to believe” that their client is
violating the law. This move should not be controversial because, under
Model Rule 1.1, a lawyer is already required to be competent in their
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representation of the client. 194 Competent representation is not possible
without a base-level knowledge of the client’s business dealings. This new
certification requirement would ensure that a lawyer remains up to date on
the client’s business but would not go as far as requiring expert knowledge
of complex financial transactions. Most importantly, a lawyer could no
longer remain willfully blind to the obvious misconduct of their clients. If a
limited due diligence and negative certification requirement were in place
before frauds like Wells Fargo and PCI, maybe the highly respected lawyers
involved would have discovered these billion-dollar problems sooner.
The concept of “willful blindness” has been explored by many in the
legal profession. It has been defined as “deliberate ignorance,” “conscious
avoidance,” and “purposeful closing of the eyes.”195 It is a concept that has
been discussed as early as mid-nineteenth century England in Regina v. Sleep
and as recently as a jury instruction in modern-day felony trials.196 While
there is ample debate about whether to apply this principle in a felony jury
trial, one thing should be clear: the legal profession would benefit if it
imposed a penalty against willful blindness in the attorney-client
relationship. We could accomplish this goal by requiring lawyers to have a
base-level knowledge of their client’s business practices, and by imposing
harsher professional responsibility penalties on those who violate it.

2. Increased Professional Responsibility
Enforcement
To adequately enforce this limited due diligence requirement, the
legal profession and individual state ethics boards would have to impose
harsher penalties for willful blindness. They could accomplish this task by
universally adopting a limited due diligence requirement, a rule of
professional conduct such as MRPC 1.13, and issuing more condemnations
for lawyer misconduct.
For example, imagine a scenario where a toddler throws a tantrum.
The parent has three choices: (1) ignore the tantrum and do nothing, (2)
address the tantrum by giving in to the toddler’s demands, or (3) address the
tantrum and discipline the child. If you ignore the tantrum, the toddler will
never learn and may even exhibit bad behavior for other children. If you
reward the tantrum, by giving into the demands, the child will always throw
194
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a tantrum to obtain whatever it is they desire. But, if you discipline the child
for throwing the tantrum, the tantrums will eventually cease, and other
children will be deterred for fear of discipline.
This is the same in a corporate context. If a lawyer exhibits
fraudulent or other misconduct, the legal profession has three choices: (1)
ignore the misconduct, (2) “slap” the lawyer on the wrist for their
misconduct, or (3) impose severe discipline that will deter future misconduct
from that lawyer and others. Each time we ignore the misconduct, it is more
likely that lawyers will inch closer to the line of fraud to maximize the value
they can bring to their client. If we impose insignificant discipline, the lawyer
might feel that they “got away with it” and the monetary return from their
conduct outweighs the risk of discipline. Finally, if we impose severe
penalties on lawyers that shirk their duties or assist their client’s fraud, that
lawyer, and all others, will be far less likely to commit overt acts of fraud
because the return no longer outweighs the risk.
While I do not advocate for a punitive disciplinary system, the
profession needs to address the scourge of lawyer misconduct in corporate
settings. This is but one method of addressing that problem. In our age of
mass media and free flow of information, the public may never regain their
trust in our profession if we do not act soon.

3. Education
While legislative and professional responsibility reforms are often
debated as the best tool to address lawyer accountability, there is another
effective means that could be immediately implemented: education. From
day one of law school, future lawyers are taught about some of the most
egregious acts of misconduct committed by other legal professionals. These
examples include scandals like Enron, where lawyers were at the helm of the
fraudulent activity. However, as scandals like Wells Fargo and Petters Group
Worldwide have shown, most legal misconduct occurs in the “gray zone.”
The competitive culture of law firms and corporations can encourage young
lawyers to commit unethical acts. It is imperative that we, as a profession,
educate aspiring lawyers about the potential perils of real-life legal practice
through law school classes and life lessons from those who have made these
very same mistakes. Similarly, as young law students, we must learn to
recognize the red flags that lead us down the road of deceit and misconduct.
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In his oft-cited law review article, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and
Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession197 ,
now-Judge Patrick J. Schiltz illuminated how young lawyers are unwittingly
drawn into the unending cycle of misconduct.198 He begins by describing the
every-day life of a first-year associate at a big law firm. Between the stresses
of learning a new profession, a new culture, and meeting seemingly
unattainable billable-hour requirements, young associates feel pressured to
“puff” their billable hours. He emphasizes that the associate will not blatantly
forge these hours but will simply borrow them from the next week or month.
While this action seems innocent, it inevitably leads the young lawyer to
commit another small step down the path of misconduct. And each
subsequent step will become easier and easier.
While Judge Schiltz’s article focuses on the daily life of a law firm
associate, the same perils are faced by corporate and in-house lawyers. When
a corporate officer or director expects a certain result, the young in-house
lawyer will feel pressure to comply even if the action seems unethical. And,
like the lawyer described above, each subsequent unethical action becomes
more and more likely.
These ethical traps are not limited to private lawyers with a thirst for
wealth. Often, they happen to ordinary people just like each of us. Through
his teaching at the University of St. Thomas School of Law and the
University of Arizona, Professor Hank Shea has forged a curriculum that
focuses on learning from the mistakes of others. As a former federal
prosecutor, Professor Shea often invites convicted felons, most of whom he
prosecuted, to talk with young law students about their past mistakes.199 After
planning many of these presentations, Professor Shea has distilled his list of
lessons down to ten main points.200 Included in this list of lessons is: avoiding
the first intentional step of misconduct, never trying to bury your mistakes
by committing more mistakes, leading by example no matter how junior you
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(1999).
198
The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz is now a District Court Judge for the District
of Minnesota.
199
Professor Henry “Hank” J. Shea was a prosecutor with the United States
Attorney’s Office in Minneapolis. He is now a part-time professor of law at the
University of St. Thomas School of Law and the University of Arizona Law School.
200
Henry “Hank” J. Shea, Top 10 List: Lessons Learned from White-Collar
Criminals, ST. THOMAS LAWYER 1 (Winter 2008).

812

U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y

[Vol. XV No. 2

are, and always acting with integrity, exhibiting courage, and doing the right
thing no matter the consequences.201 These presentations and lessons have
proven to be just as valuable to the past-offenders and their restoration as
they have been to educating the minds of young lawyers. These cost-free
educational presentations are just one step the profession could take to
prevent lawyers from committing the same misdeeds as Enron, Wells Fargo,
and Petters Group Worldwide.

VI.

CONCLUSION

If the legal profession had adopted a due diligence requirement,
scandals like those described above may not have occurred. If the legal
profession seriously enforced its own rules of professional conduct, the
lawyers involved in these scandals would not have escaped all forms of
liability. If the legal profession educated its young law students about the
perils of legal practice, it would avoid the constant scrutiny of Congress and
the American people following every major corporate scandal in the past,
present, and future.
There are many lessons that can be learned from scandals like Enron,
Petters Group Worldwide, and Wells Fargo, but none is more apparent than
the notion that anyone could fall victim to the allures and pressures of
greed—even us lawyers. But hope is not out-of-reach. If we finally live up to
our moral mandate, if we finally hold one another accountable, and if we
finally grapple with our ugly past of misconduct, fraud, and inadequate
enforcement of our own rules of professional conduct—we may finally reach
our desired destination. We may finally answer the ultimate question of
“when are we going to learn?” We are going to learn early, we are going to
learn often, and we are going to learn together.
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